Breaking Taboos in Fair Machine Learning: An Experimental Study

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ABSTRACT

Many scholars, engineers, and policymakers believe that algorithmic fairness requires disregarding information about certain characteristics of individuals, such as their race or gender. Often, the mandate to "blind" algorithms in this way is conveyed as an unconditional ethical imperative—a minimal requirement of fair treatment—and any contrary practice is assumed to be morally and politically untenable. However, in some circumstances, prohibiting algorithms from considering information about race or gender can in fact lead to worse outcomes for racial minorities and women, complicating the rationale for blinding. In this paper, we conduct a series of randomized studies to investigate attitudes toward blinding algorithms, both among the general public as well as among computer scientists and professional lawyers. We find, first, that people are generally averse to the use of race and gender in algorithmic determinations of "pretrial risk"—the risk that criminal defendants pose to the public if released while awaiting trial. We find, however, that this preference for blinding shifts in response to a relatively mild intervention. In particular, we show that support for the use of race and gender in algorithmic decision-making increases substantially after respondents read a short passage about the possibility that blinding could lead to higher detention rates for Black and female defendants, respectively. Similar effect sizes are observed among the general public, computer scientists, and professional lawyers. These findings suggest that, while many respondents attest that they prefer blind algorithms, their preference is not based on an absolute principle. Rather, blinding is perceived as a way to ensure better outcomes for members of marginalized groups. Accordingly, in circumstances where blinding serves to disadvantage marginalized groups, respondents no longer view the exclusion of protected characteristics as a moral imperative, and the use of such information may become politically viable.

1 INTRODUCTION

For decades, anti-discrimination law has been marked by a debate over two distinct interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution [32]. Roughly speaking, one interpretation focuses on process and the other on outcomes [1]. The process-based view interprets the mandate not to discriminate as a colorblind "anticlassification" principle, concerned with treating citizens as individuals and not as members of racial or other groups. Under this anticlassification view of discrimination, a government policy or decision that classifies individuals based on protected characteristics, such as race or gender, is discriminatory.

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In contrast, the outcome-based view focuses on how members of different groups ultimately fare under a policy. Under this "antisubordination" view of discrimination, policies are discriminatory if they exacerbate existing inequalities between groups. In particular, a policy that considers protected characteristics may be justified if it reduces social stratification. Further, in the antisubordination view, even a policy that applies equally to members of all race groups can be deemed discriminatory if it burdens those of a protected group disproportionately.

In practice, the process- and outcome-based views often align, pointing to the same decisions. For example, *Brown v. Board*, the Supreme Court emphasized both views in striking down segregation in education.[1] In some instances, however, the two principles come into direct conflict. For instance, consider a public university that automatically awards 20 out of 100 points to applicants from an underrepresented minority group.[2] Under a process-based, anticlassification approach, this policy is discriminatory because it requires classifying individuals based on their race, which is forbidden regardless of intent or outcomes. By contrast, under an antisubordination approach, the affirmative action policy is not necessarily discriminatory, because its purpose and effect is to benefit members of a marginalized group, thereby reducing social inequality.

Despite the centrality of this longstanding debate to anti-discrimination law, equivalent discussions are largely absent in current discourse about algorithmic decision making. The dominant view is that the use of protected characteristics for algorithmic predictions necessarily constitutes a discriminatory practice. In this way, a process-based view of discrimination is taken for granted. Dissenting or cautionary voices, although they exist, are not numerous [6, 7, 13, 18, 25]. When it comes to algorithmic decision making, the battle is not over whether the removal of data pertaining to protected characteristics is necessary or desirable, but whether it is sufficient. Consistent with that view, the last several years have seen an influx of studies that examine not only the removal gender, race, and other protected characteristics, but also of the many proxies, like one's home zip code, that may correlate with these characteristics in a significant way [3, 5, 24, 36].

Yet it remains unclear what rationale underlies the resistance to using protected characteristics in algorithmic decision making. In many cases, commentators have not been explicit in their reasoning. Where reasons are given, the justifications often reflect one of two modes of ethical reasoning: Under a *deontological* account,

[1] Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
[2] The facts are taken from *Gratz v. Bollinger*, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). Earlier affirmative action practices heard by the Supreme Court were upheld based on a diversity rationale, which emphasizes the benefits of creating a diverse student body. The diversity framework has since become central, and the antisubordination rationale marginal, in modern affirmative action jurisprudence.

decision rules can be morally permissible or impermissible, irrespective of their consequences. A deontological justification for blind algorithms holds that it would be "fundamentally unethical or immoral" to condition the allocation of costs and benefits on an individual's group membership [12, 16, 34, 35].[3] Accordingly, under this account, there is independent value to a blind algorithm, regardless of how blinding affects the algorithmic predictions, because the use of protected characteristics to guide decisions is itself unacceptable.

In contrast, a *consequentialist* view judges the morality of a decision rule based solely on its outcomes. The ethical permissibility of blinding is derived not from the conviction that blinding itself is a virtue, but from the assumption that blinding is a helpful means to achieving more equitable outcomes. In this way, a consequentialist justification for blinding is based on an underlying assumption that the inclusion of protected characteristics will likely disadvantage members of already-disadvantaged groups, such as racial minorities. Articulating this view in the context of pretrial risk assessments, former U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder suggests that "basing sentencing decisions on static factors and immutable characteristics . . . may exacerbate unwarranted and unjust disparities that are already far too common in our criminal justice system and in our society."[4]

While the two viewpoints often lead to the same conclusion that algorithms should be blind, recent findings complicate this picture. For example, requiring risk assessment tools to ignore gender has been shown to result in an overestimation of the risk that female defendants will recidivate [6, 33]. If risk assessment tools were permitted to consider gender, not only would the resulting risk scores align better with actual recidivism rates, but they would likely yield lower rates of pre-trial detention for female defendants. Thus, a "gender-specific" tool, unlike a gender-blind tool, may result in better outcomes for members of the marginalized group, even if it violates the deontological rule against a consideration of gender.

In the same vein, blinding risk assessment tools to race may overstate the recidivism risk for Black defendants under specific circumstances. As Mayson [25] suggests, disparate policing practices may render prior arrest and conviction records of Black defendants relatively uninformative about future recidivism risk. As a result, race-blind algorithmic risk assessments can overstate recidivism risk for Black individuals relative to white individuals. A similar phenomenon could, in theory, lead to higher auto insurance rates for Black and Hispanic drivers. Common insurance-pricing algorithms rely in part on the number of speeding tickets a driver has received, and so discriminatory traffic enforcement practices could result in inflated estimates of collision risk [27].

As these examples illustrate, avoiding the use of protected characteristics through the use of blind algorithms can, in some instances, lead to worse outcomes for members of a historically disadvantaged group. Because the two leading theories point to different prescriptions, these studies highlight the importance of identifying the underlying justification for the preference of blind algorithms. Under a deontological, anticlassificationist conception, blinding should be preserved even if doing so imposes costs on the members disadvantaged groups. Under a consequentialist, antisubordination conception, by contrast, it may be permissible—or even necessary—to consider protected characteristics when doing so avoids imposing additional burden on marginalized groups.

In this experimental study, we assess the normative basis for the widespread preference for blind algorithms. Surveying a representative sample of the U.S. population, as well as computer scientists and lawyers, we first confirm that, in the absence of additional information, respondents strongly prefer algorithmic tools that avoid the use of race and gender in the context of pretrial risk assessments. In explaining their preference, respondents frequently employ moralizing language, suggesting that their aversion to race- and gender-specific tools stems from process-based concerns about treating individuals differently based on group membership. However, we then show that these anticlassificationist preferences are fragile: a minimal intervention in which respondents read two paragraphs about the abstract possibility that blinding can impose additional burdens on marginalized groups drastically increases the approval for the inclusion of protected characteristics. This intervention yields similar effect sizes among the general public, computer scientists, and lawyers. Further, when we prompted participants to justify their preference in an open-ended question, we found that hardly any respondents explicitly referred to outcomes. However, when forced to choose between a process-based justification (focused on the harm of classifying) and an outcome-based justification (focused on the harm of perpetuating group subordination), a sizeable minority of respondents selected outcome-based reasoning as being closer to their own motivation. It is this latter group of "closet consequentialists" that drives much of the effect that we observe.

Our results suggest that the preference for blind algorithms, although often framed in ethical terms that suggest an unconditional position, is not grounded in a universal belief that the use of protected characteristics is taboo or morally forbidden. Instead, it appears that stated preferences are driven in part by a consideration of outcomes. Many evidently treat blinding as a useful heuristic that is more likely to avoid additional burden on marginalized groups, and their beliefs thus dependent on the specific circumstances. Our findings call into question the prevailing sentiment that algorithms must eschew race and gender information. As such, they highlight the need for a serious and detailed discussion on the welfare costs and ethical virtues of blind decision making. Depending on the context, a balancing of these competing interests may argue in favor of the inclusion of protected characteristics in specific situations.

2 BACKGROUND & RELATED WORK

Protected class features in algorithmic decision making are often treated as if their exclusion was legally required. However, this is not the case. While the Supreme Court has never ruled on the legality of the use of protected characteristics in algorithmic decision

[3] Such reasoning is also consistent with the anticlassification rationale articulated in judicial opinions. "At the heart of this [process-based, anticlassificationist] interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause lies the principle that the government must treat citizens as individuals, and not as members of racial, ethnic, or religious groups." (Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120–21 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).

[4] Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 57th Annual Meeting and 13th State Criminal Justice Network Conference, available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder- speaks-national-association-criminal-defense-lawyers-57th.

making, we can turn to general principles of anti-discrimination law to observe that current doctrine recognizes some important exceptions to the general rule that the government may not draw distinctions between individuals based on suspect classifications.

2.1 Legal background

Constitutional prohibitions on discrimination are encoded in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Equal Protection doctrine is primarily committed to the anticlassification principle, which prohibits policies that, overtly or surreptitiously, condition on a forbidden category [31]. However, this does not mean that any consideration of a protected characteristic is prohibited. Instead, under current doctrine, Equal Protection claims are assessed using different tiers of scrutiny, which aim to reflect the presumptive legitimacy or illegitimacy of particular justifications for considering protected characteristics. Higher levels of scrutiny require an increasingly important state interest at stake and a closer nexus between that end and the means used to accomplish it [23].

If a law or policy considers an individual's race, it is subjected to *strict scrutiny*. Strict scrutiny requires that the law or policy advances a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly tailored to that interest.[5]

Today, the most relevant example of a race-conscious practice surviving strict scrutiny can be found in affirmative action in higher education. In this context, the Court has determined that "educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body" serve a compelling state interest.[6] Under this rationale, public universities may consider an applicant's race, so long as the assessment of each candidate is individualized and race is not used as a penalty or for quotas. A further exception exists where public entities have contributed to past racial discrimination. In those instances, it may be permissible for that entity to enact race-conscious policies in order to remedy its historical discriminatory conduct.[7]

In contrast to race-based classifications, gender-based discrimination is subject to a lower standard of review, called *intermediate scrutiny*. Under this standard, discrimination requires an "important" or "exceedingly persuasive" interest and a "substantial relationship" between the discriminatory law or policy and the interest in order to survive a constitutional challenge.[8] As with race, the case law is not exceedingly instructive to paint a complete picture of the possible exceptions to the rule that policies should eschew the use of gender.[9]

Few cases have assessed discrimination in the context of algorithmic decision making. Perhaps the most relevant case to date is *State v. Loomis*, decided in 2016 by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.[10] In that case, the male petitioner, Eric Loomis, challenged the use of COMPAS, a risk assessment tool used to inform sentencing decisions. Loomis claimed that the use of the proprietary algorithm violated his right to due process, and that it impermissibly took into account information about the defendant's gender. The court declined to rule on whether the use of gender in algorithmic risk assessment violates the Equal Protection Clause, and limited its analysis to the question of whether such a practice is consistent with due process. On this question, the court determined that the use of gender was not prohibited, because it was deployed for the nondiscriminatory purpose of promoting accuracy in predictions [13]. Further, the court noted that Loomis had not provided sufficient evidence that gender had actually factored into his sentence. Although the decision was appealed, the Supreme Court denied hearing the case. *Loomis* can be considered a first indication that the use of gender in algorithmic decision-making is not categorically illegal. That said, future developments in the case law will help sketch out the precise contours of the relevant exceptions.

In sum, while anti-discrimination doctrine generally disfavors race- and gender-conscious policies, courts recognize exceptions where such policies serve important ends that could not be achieved without attention to protected characteristics. How this framework applies to algorithmic decision making remains to be seen. The scholarly literature, for its part, is converging on the view that the use of protected features in algorithmic decision making is or should be strictly prohibited. This sentiment is often justified on normative grounds: many assert that it is immoral to condition algorithmic decisions on an individual's group membership [12, 16, 34, 35].

However, given that the use of protected characteristics can sometimes lead to significantly improved outcomes for members of the disadvantaged groups, some commentators have recently suggested a more nuanced approach [21]. For instance, Huq [18, 19] argues that Equal Protection law can accommodate the use of race-conscious algorithms in the criminal justice system and that many of the justifications underlying the anticlassification principle do not apply when the decision is made by an algorithm. Oleson [26] argues that the use of protected characteristics, if used to benefit members of protected groups, is a form of affirmative action. As detailed above, affirmative action is the most well developed exception to the anticlassification principle under the Equal Protection clause and could render the use of protected features permissible under the standard formulated in *Grutter v. Bollinger*. Bent [4] suggests that a race- or gender-specific algorithm may be permissible if it seeks to remedy past discrimination. And on a more fundamental level, Yang and Dobbie [36] join previous critiques of the Supreme Court's embrace of the anticlassification principle [15, 29]. They seek a revival of the antisubordination principle under Equal Protection doctrine, which would shift focus from process to outcomes and would then allow the use of protected characteristics for remedial purposes. It thus appears that the inclusion of protected

[5] Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). Historically, the strict scrutiny standard has been deployed in cases justifying government practices which, today, appear profoundly unethical. In *Hirabayashi v. United States*, 320 U.S. 81, 95 (1943), and *Korematsu v. United States*, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), the Supreme Court held that curfews and forced relocations specifically targeting Japanese Americans were constitutional because they would be "necessary to meet the threat of sabotage and espionage which would substantially affect the war effort and which might reasonably be expected to aid a threatened enemy invasion." *Korematsu* has since been explicitly repudiated by the court. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).

[6] Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).

[7] Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277-78 (1986). Congress may also seek to remedy generalized assertions of racial discrimination, *see* City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 88 U.S. 469 (1989).

[8] Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 530 (1996).

[9] Prior cases in which the Supreme Court assumed a sufficiently important state interest often appear outdated. For instance, it assumed that the state's interest in avoiding "illegitimate pregnancies" would justify a California statute that punished rape only if the sexual intercourse involved a woman. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 471 (1981). That law has since been revised.

[10] State v. Loomis, 2016 WI 68 (2016).

characteristics, if used for the benefit of members in the protected group, may be consistent with current anti-discrimination laws.

2.2 Attitudes toward algorithms

Our study considers and experimentally manipulates respondents' views on algorithmic decision making. In doing so, it contributes not only to the legal and ethical discourse surrounding blind decision making, but also to an emerging literature on attitudes toward algorithms.

Previous work has demonstrated an aversion among the general public towards algorithmic decision making that appears to be fueled by a tendency to assign more weight to errors made by algorithms than by human forecasters [8]. The aversion is difficult to overcome and seems to persist, regardless of whether the decision making process is transparent or not [28]. One of the few interventions that has proven promising in increasing support for algorithmic decision-making is to offer respondents the option of altering the algorithmic predictions [9].

Although not an experiment, Grgic-Hlaca et al. [14] surveyed 100 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers for their perception of the fairness of the use of different features in the context of pre-trial risk assessments. They found that 21% of participants viewed the inclusion of race as fair. However, when subsequently asked if the inclusion of race is fair if it makes the prediction more accurate, 42% of respondents responded positively. For gender, these numbers were 26% and 55% respectively. Similarly, Harrison et al. [17] asked respondents to choose between: (i) an algorithm that uses race as a feature but leads to equality in either accuracy, false positive rate or outcomes; and (ii) an algorithm that does not use race as a feature but leads to differences in accuracy, false positive rates or outcomes. Outcomes were defined as the likelihood of a defendant being granted bail. The authors find a general preference for blind algorithms, even when they lead to disparities in accuracy or outcomes. However, when asked to decide between a blind algorithm or one that leads to an equal false positive rate, respondents were split. Although neither of the two studies directly tests the interaction of process- and outcome-based justifications for the exclusion of protected features, they do offer preliminary support for the hypothesis that outcomes and effects implicate attitudes toward algorithmic decision-making procedures.

3 STUDY DESIGN

We designed and conducted a 3-part experiment in which participants were randomly assigned to receive information about the outcomes of an algorithmic decision-making process in the context of pretrial risk assessments. For this study, we partnered with Prolific Academic to recruit a representative sample of the U.S. population (n=1,009).[11] The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at the our university, and was pre-registered with AsPredicted. Respondents were paid $3 for their participation in the study, which took approximately 10 minutes to complete. The main survey was administered via Qualtrics.com in July of 2020.

After completing a CAPTCHA and attention check, participants were asked to read a short scenario and make judgments about it. The scenario began by explaining the practice of pretrial detention:

> When a person is accused of a crime, a judge typically determines whether the defendant should remain in jail until his or her trial, or whether he or she can be safely released under specific conditions while waiting for the trial.

3.1 Domain manipulation

Participants were then introduced to the proposal of using algorithmic risk assessments in decisions about pretrial release. Half of participants were asked to consider whether the risk assessment tools should take into account the race of the defendant; half were asked to consider the same question as it pertained to defendant gender. Subsequently, participants were randomly assigned to one of three information conditions, described below, before being asked to report their preferences.

3.2 Information manipulation

No Context (Control Condition): Participants assigned to the control condition (n = 126) were given no further information before answering the outcome measures, which (as described below) measured their preference regarding the inclusion of race (or gender) as a feature in algorithmic risk assessments, and probed the reasoning behind their preference.

General Context: Participants (n = 120) assigned to the "general context" condition were told that some experts favor allowing the risk assessment tools to take account of race [gender]. The goal was to mimic the type of information respondents may receive if they follow political discourse or public debates in the media that invokes expert opinions on the design of risk assessment tools. Our description of expert opinions for the race-specific algorithm was inspired by Mayson [25]. Respondents in the race domain were told:

> Some experts have argued that not considering a defendant's race could ultimately lead to worse outcomes for black defendants. This is a summary of their argument: "Black men are frequently arrested for minor violations of the law, whereas white men are let go. So a black man with three prior arrests does not indicate a particularly high risk to the public. In contrast, a white man with three prior arrests indicates that the defendant had serious conflicts with the law. A race-blind algorithm would not take into account this difference. It would treat a black defendant and a white defendant with prior arrests as posing an identical risk to the public. In this way, a race-blind algorithm perpetuates racial inequality by overestimating the risk posed by black defendants and underestimating the risk posed by white defendants. It discriminates on the basis of race." Based on this rationale, some experts have suggested that race should be included in a risk assessment.

Our description of expert opinions for gender-specific algorithms was designed to be a content-adjusted, close analogue to the description on race. In particular, it read:

[11] The sample is representative with respect to sex, age and ethnicity.

> Some experts have argued that not considering a defendant's gender could ultimately lead to worse outcomes for female defendants. This is a summary of their argument: "Women are much less likely to be involved in a violent crime than men. Similarly, upon release, a female defendant is less likely to commit a violent crime than a male defendant. A gender-blind algorithm would not take into account this difference. It would treat the male and female defendant as posing an identical risk to the public. In this way, a gender-blind algorithm perpetuates gender inequality by overestimating the risk posed by women and underestimating the risk posed by men. It discriminates on the basis of gender." Based on this rationale, some experts have suggested that gender should be included in a risk assessment.

After reading the relevant passage, participants were asked to imagine two different tools for risk assessment: a race-blind tool, which does not take into account the defendant's race when it assess a defendant's risk to the public, and a race-specific tool which does take account of race. Those assigned to the gender domain were asked to consider a gender-blind vs. gender-specific algorithm.

Specific Context: Participants (n = 613) assigned to the "specific context" condition were given specific information about how the racial [gender] composition of the pool of defendants who are released would be affected by taking race [gender] into account. They were presented with the results from a "hypothetical study" and given illustrations showing how many out of 100 Black [female] defendants and how many out of every 100 white [male] defendants would be released and detained, under blind and tailored algorithms. The blind algorithm always released 50% of individuals in the protected and unprotected groups. The proportions released under the tailored algorithm varied numerically and respondents within the "specific context" condition were presented with one of the following five scenarios with equal probability:

- Release 30% of Black [female] defendants and 70% of white [male] defendants
- Release 45% of Black [female] defendants and 55% of white [male] defendants
- Release 50% of Black [female] defendants and 50% of white [male] defendants
- Release 55% of Black [female] defendants and 45% of white [male] defendants
- Release 70% of Black [female] defendants and 30% of white [male] defendants

An illustration is presented in Figure 1.

A comprehension-check question asked participants to report which tool releases more Black [female] defendants, offering three choices: race-blind tool releases more defendants, race-specific tool releases more defendants, and both tools release the same number. Before measuring their preferences, participants were asked to presume that the study results they saw would hold true in their state.



Figure 1: An illustration of the information presented to respondents in one of the "specific context" conditions. In this case, while the race-blind tool releases an equal proportion of Black and white defendants, the race-specific tool releases a greater proportion of Black defendants than white defendants.

3.3 Outcome measures

The primary outcome measure asked participants to choose between a race-blind risk assessment tool and a race-conscious tool (or, for those assigned to the gender domain, to choose between a gender-blind and gender-conscious tool). Participants were offered five answer choices:

- Strongly prefer race-blind tool
- Slightly prefer race-blind tool
- Slightly prefer race-specific tool
- Strongly prefer race specific tool
- Other

Next, participants were presented with an empty text box and asked to explain their response. Following the open response, participants were presented with two rationales for why one might believe that risk assessment tools should not take into account defendants' race (or gender). The order of the presentation of the two rationales was randomized. One rationale reflected a deontological justification by suggesting that blinding is unethical *per se*:

> I wouldn't want to let a risk assessment tool take into account people's race [gender]. It's wrong to categorize people based on their race [gender], because this means that the decision whether or not to release a black [female] defendant is based on what other black [female] defendants have done in the past. It is important to treat people as individuals without paying attention to their race [gender].

The other rationale reflected consequentialist justifications, voicing instrumental reasons for avoiding blind algorithms:

> I wouldn't want to let a risk assessment tool take into account people's race [gender]. Paying attention to race [gender] could lead to more black defendants [women] being detained and more white defendants [men] being released. It is important to make sure that black [female] defendants are not disadvantaged by algorithmic decision-making, which is best achieved

> by removing race [gender] from the calculation altogether.

Participants were asked to indicate which of the above two views most closely aligns with their own. Following these primary measures, participants provided additional information regarding their general views on incarceration, as well as several demographic factors, such as their age, gender, political affiliation, and education, including their familiarity with law and computer science.

In a second pre-registered study in August of 2020, we partnered with Prolific Academic to recruit 209 U.S.-based computer scientists to complete the same survey measures.[12] Due to sample size constraints, we randomly assigned participants to only two information conditions: the control condition ("no context") and the "general context" condition. This manipulation was crossed with the race-vs.-gender manipulation, yielding a 2x2 factorial design. In a third pre-registered study in September of 2020, we partnered with Centiment[13] to recruit 249 practicing lawyers in the United States. They completed the same survey as the computer scientists. We collected responses from these two additional groups under the assumption that they represent two of the most relevant actors in the process of algorithmic design: The computer scientists as those who design the algorithms and the lawyers as those who impose regulatory constraints on their design.

3.4 Limitations

There are three potential limitations with our study design that we intend to address. First, under the "specific context" condition, we only inform respondents about the proportion of released defendants within each group. We omit other information that may be important in making an informed fairness decision, such as the effect on public safety. In opting for this design, our goal was to make the consequences of the group-specific algorithm as transparent as possible while minimizing the cognitive load on respondents. For instance, providing partial information about the algorithm's performance in order to inform public safety considerations would have raised the question of what performance measures to share. Given the breadth of potential measures as well as their differing interactions with considerations of fairness [7], we determined that providing respondents with only some information that is relevant to public safety would be infeasible and would hurt, rather than help comprehension. At the same time, providing respondents with all relevant information, including various performance metrics, would have increased the cognitive demand significantly. We thus chose to rely on respondents' priors about public safety implications and fairness. We note that none of the free text responses implied that respondents felt they needed additional information about public safety before being able to make a decision.

Next, and related, one may be concerned that respondents in the "specific context" condition knew about the hypothetical nature of the results and thus did not take it seriously. In order to rule out that this assumption affects our responses, one "specific context" condition presented participants with real data from Broward County, FL. Half of participants who saw the Broward County data were then told that the study results are hypothetical, while the other half were told that the results are from a real study. We found similar stated preferences across the two groups, suggesting that the hypothetical nature of the information does not appreciably affect our results.[14]



Figure 2: The distribution of preferences for blind risk assessment tools, among respondents in the "no context" condition. Respondents overwhelmingly express at least a weak preference for race-blind and gender-blind tools.

Last, one may be concerned that we measured respondents' preferences for outcome-focused and process-focused reasoning only after informing them about the potential effects of the blind tool. In order to rule out any priming effects, we compared preferences for deontological vs. consequentialist reasoning between those in the "no context" condition (where no priming took place) and those in other conditions, finding similar results across groups.[15]

4 RESULTS

We begin by examining the baseline preference for group-specific (or "tailored") algorithms in our representative sample of U.S adults. Figure 2 depicts the approval rate for race- and gender-specific algorithms for respondents in the "no context" condition (i.e., those who received no additional information). As can be seen, the vast majority of respondents either strongly or weakly prefer the race-blind over the race-specific tool (90% vs 10%), with 76% of respondents saying they "strongly prefer" the blind tool. These findings establish a striking aversion against the use of race as a predictive feature that is consistent with prior literature [14]. When asked to state their reasons, respondents highlight that the use of race would be highly immoral and unethical. For instance, one respondent suggests that "[i]n the U.S., practices, where race is used as a factor to determine whether someone is deemed dangerous or not, is morally wrong, and in some cases, illegal to do. Racial profiling isn't the best way to determine one's livelihood and our country is better than that." Another indicates that "[t]here is already way too much racial bias

[12] We collected 242 responses that, according to Prolific's prescreening, were computer scientists or computer science students. However, 33 of them did not respond affirmatively when we asked them whether they had or were working on a computer science degree, so we excluded them from our analysis.

[13] Centiment.co

[14] The average response among those who were told the study was real is -1, corresponding to a weak preference for the blind tool. Among those who were simply asked to imagine the results hold true, the average response was -0.86. The difference is statistically insignificant.

[15] The share of respondents that preferred outcome-centered reasoning is 0.25 among those in the "no context" condition and 0.32 among all others.



Figure 3: Support for tailored tools is substantially higher in the "general context" condition, where respondents receive information about the abstract possibility that the inclusion of protected features could increase release rates among Black and female defendants. Point estimates are displayed with 95% confidence intervals.



Figure 4: Comparison of preferences between the general population, computer scientists, and lawyers, in both the "no context" and "general context" conditions. We find that preferences are similar across all three groups. Point estimates are displayed with 95% confidence intervals.

against minorities, especially blacks and First Nations. Deliberately making a tool that's racially based is biased and wrong."

Respondents similarly have a baseline preference for gender-blind tools, although that preference is somewhat muted (65% vs 35%). Those that do prefer a gender-specific tool often express their belief that women have lower rates of recidivism and should thus benefit from the inclusion of gender as a feature. Indeed, 55% of respondents who prefer the tailored tool specifically reference a lower propensity for female defendants to commit crimes. For instance, one respondent states: "While I'm well aware that men and women can be equally horrible I think that testosterone should be taken into account and that the reality is that men tend to be much more violent than women." And another says: "I'm under the general understanding that men are statistically more violent than women, therefore a gender bias may sometimes be necessary in risk assessment."

Next, we translate responses into numerical values of equal distance ranging from -3 for "strongly prefer blind tool" to 3 for "strongly prefer tailored tool." In Figure 3, we then contrast the average rates of approval for the tailored tools between those in the "no context" condition and those in the "general context," where respondents receive information about the abstract possibility that the inclusion of protected features could increase release rates among Black or female defendants. As can be seen, providing abstract information in this way significantly increases the approval for both race- and gender-specific algorithms. The increase is statistically significant by conventional measures.[16] Indeed, under the general context condition, we can no longer reject the hypothesis that respondents have, on average, no preference for the blind tools.

When examining the open-text responses of those who prefer the race-specific algorithm, it appears noteworthy that many respondents justify their decision by invoking the higher quality of the predictions that would result under the use of race. For instance, one respondent states that "[the tailored tool] will compensate for racial inequality and do a better job at predicting those who pose a risk." Another says: "I think includ[ing] the race specific criteria will help the algorithm make more accurate predictions." Save for two exceptions, no respondent clearly states that their preference for the race-specific tool is due to a higher release rate for Black defendants.[17] Notably, respondents shied away from providing overtly consequentialist justifications for their preferences even though the "general context" provided a clearly consequentialist argument. This finding is consistent with other research showing that consequentialist decision rules are viewed as immoral or less legitimate than decision rules grounded in a deontological conception of ethics [10, 11, 30].

In Figure 4, we contrast the responses of the general population to that of computer scientists and lawyers. Interestingly, the treatment effect is both substantively and statistically similar across all groups. To us, this finding is surprising, as lawyers have been among the most vocal advocates for a process-based account for the ethical necessity of blinding in algorithmic decision making. Our results suggest that these tendencies may exist only in their stated preferences, but do not survive an experimental manipulation.

We have shown that manipulating respondent's beliefs about the possible outcome under a race- or gender-specific algorithm alters their approval. We now consider the effect size of this manipulation across varying levels of intensity of the treatment. In Figure 5, we plot the average approval rate across each of our "specific context" conditions. Recall that respondents had to choose between: (i) a blind algorithm releasing 50% of minority and 50% of non-minority defendants; and (ii) and a tailored algorithm releasing λ% of minority and 100-λ% of non-minority defendants. The x-axis depicts λ, the

[16] For race, $p < 0.001$, and for gender, $p = 0.048$. Significance levels based on a t-test.

[17] A few respondents state motivations that appear to focus both on outcomes and process:

> I'm not 100% sure that I agree with the race-specific tool but considering what was explained it would most likely be more beneficial for there to be a race-specific assessment tool. The non-race specific tool would make everything more equal but the problem is that there are high levels of discrimination in this country.

In addition:

> In the example given, it does appear to be correct to have race added. In this way differences in the way races are sentenced can be equalized.



Figure 5: The distribution of preferences in the "specific context" conditions, where respondents are presented with five scenarios in which the tailored tool results in different levels of release for Black or female defendants. As the proportion released under the tailored tool increases, so does support for the tailored tool. The red points indicate the average level of support in each condition, the jittered black points display the full distribution, and the blue line depicts a regression of support on proportion released.



Figure 6: The distribution of preferences in the "no context" condition and the "specific context" conditions in which less than 50% of Black or female defendants are released. Preferences are similar in the two groups, supporting the view that, without further information, respondents generally believe group-specific algorithms result in lower release rates for Black and female defendants.

proportion of minority defendants released under each treatment condition. The y-axis depicts the rate of approval for the tailored tool. The blue line depicts a linear regression of the approval on the numeric proportion of released minority defendants.

Perhaps by now unsurprisingly, respondents' approval of the tailored tool increases with the share of minority defendants that are released under it. Interestingly, under no "specific context" condition is the approval for the race-specific tool as large as under the "general context" condition. We do not know the reason for this result, although we conjecture that the examples we included in our general context condition may have been more relatable than our specific context condition. This view seems to be supported by some of the open-text responses under the general context condition, in which respondents pick up on our specific examples to justify their decision.

Having found that respondents' aversion to the inclusion of protected characteristics can be significantly reduced if they learn about the potential for adverse consequences, we now consider further evidence that their motivations are driven by a consideration of outcomes. First, we hypothesize that respondents' baseline aversion to race-specific algorithms are grounded in the belief that the inclusion of race would lead to higher detention rates among Black defendants. If true, it should be the case that respondents do not update their beliefs and/or reported aversion in response to the information that the tailored algorithm will detain more Black defendants. In Figure 6, we contrast responses of participants in the "no context" condition to those in the "specific context" condition in which release rates of the race-specific algorithm are lower than in the blind algorithm. As can be seen, responses are virtually identical, suggesting that respondents' baseline belief is that the inclusion of race increases incarceration rates for Black defendants. For gender-specific algorithms, we see some differences between the two conditions, which is consistent with the view of some respondents—expressed in the open-text responses—that the



Figure 7: Support for group-specific tools among self-identified consequentialists and deontologists. The effect of the "general context" treatment is larger for consequentialsts than for deontologists. Point estimates are displayed with 95% confidence intervals.

inclusion of gender would lead to lower detention rates for female defendants.

In a last step, we contrast responses by those who identify as focusing on process with those who state that outcome-based reasons are more consistent with their own motivation. As explained above, we identify respondents' preferred philosophy based on their answer to the question described in Section 3.3. As can be seen in Figure 7, responses under the "no context" condition are roughly similar between the two groups. However, the treatment effect under the "general context" condition is greater for self-identified consequentialists. Interestingly, however, even self-identified deontologists are more receptive to the tailored tool if it implies higher release rates for Black defendants.

5 DISCUSSION

Our findings suggest that the aversion to using protected characteristics in algorithmic decision making can be drastically decreased by making salient to respondents that blinding could have adverse outcomes for members of protected groups. This finding is observed across a representative sample of the general population in the U.S., as well as among computer scientists and professional lawyers. The effect size is largest for our general context condition, which seeks to mirror the abstract way in which information is portrayed in the media and public discourse. In addition, we show that much of the aversion to tailored algorithms is consistent with the belief that tailoring would increase the burden on protected groups. In sum, our results present strong evidence in support of the hypothesis that a large share of the population views blinding not as a moral imperative, but as an instrument to achieve equitable outcomes. Indeed, under the general context condition, the average approval for the use of race- and gender-specific algorithms is close to 0 (on a scale ranging from -3 to 3), suggesting respondents are largely ambivalent in their preference for blind versus group-specific algorithms. This finding suggests that the use of race- or gender-specific algorithms may be politically viable if it can be ensured that they lead to improvements for members of the protected group.

Perhaps the most obvious policy suggestion flowing from our results is an auditing solution. Policy makers could begin by comparing two models, one including the protected features and one excluding them. If the tailored algorithm leads to greater benefits or lower costs for members of the protected group, it would be implemented. Otherwise, the blind algorithm would be used.

We note, however, that the legality of auditing and selecting algorithms in this way is unclear. Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on the exact issue, the most relevant opinion is found in *Ricci v. DeStefano* from 2009.[18] In this case, the New Haven Fire Department issued a standardized test to determine promotions of their firefighters. After the firefighters had taken the test, the department found that none of the Black candidates achieved test scores that were high enough for a promotion. Subsequently, officials decided to invalidate the test. The firefighters who would have been promoted under the test sued, alleging racial discrimination because the decision to invalidate the test scores was done under an explicit consideration of the applicants' race. New Haven argued that they needed to invalidate the test because it led to disparities in outcomes across racial groups, which would be unlawful under the disparate impact doctrine of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Supreme Court sided with the plaintiffs, holding that New Haven's claim that their test would have positioned them in conflict with Title VII lacked the required "strong basis in evidence."[19]

Experts debate whether the decision in *Ricci* implies that the practice of auditing and revising algorithms with an eye for their disparate consequences is unlawful [2, 20, 22]. It is difficult to predict how the Supreme Court would rule. Yet we point out a few aspects that distinguish the New Haven test scores from the described policy recommendation. First, *Ricci* was decided under Title VII, which is a statutory anti-discrimination law that regulates employment practices. The Supreme Court has developed an extensive body of case law under Title VII. The resulting doctrine does not fully mirror doctrinal developments under the Equal Protection Clause. For instance, in addition to race-conscious hiring practices, Title VII expressly recognizes as discriminatory policies that are facially neutral, but impose an unequal burden on minorities.[20] There are thus limited inferences one may draw for discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, which would govern most governmental policies outside of the employment context, including the use of risk assessment tools. In fact, the Supreme Court in *Ricci* expressly refused to asses how the case would be decided under the Equal Protection Clause.

Second, and more importantly, the majority rests its opinion in *Ricci* to a large extent on the fact that the New Haven Fire Department, in administering the test, created an expectation in the firefighters not to be judged on the basis of their race. It is this expectation that they then frustrated when they discarded the scores.[21] Policy makers could try to avoid the creation of similar expectations by clearly communicating that the reduction of inequalities in outcomes is one of their stated goals in designing the algorithm.

Third, and closely related, in *Ricci*, the New Haven Fire Department chose to discard the test scores *after* the test had been taken. In that way, their practice barred the promotion of firefighters after they had already been entitled to a promotion. An auditing process as we have described it above could easily avoid this outcome. For instance, in assessing the likely effects of including race for algorithmic risk predictions, the models could be fit on historical data. In this way, the decision whether or not to use the race-specific algorithm would be made without using information on the individual defendants who are affected by the decision. All these differences could provide grounds for distinguishing *Ricci* from algorithmic auditing practices in a legally relevant way. However, absent a clear decision, relevant practices would remain in a constitutional grey area.

Beyond the need for more clarity on the legal framework, our results point to the importance of a normative discussion surrounding the ethics and virtues of blind decision making. Contrary to a key assumption underlying the current debate, there appears to be no widely shared assumption that the inclusion of protected features is immoral or taboo. Indeed, it appears at least plausible that a more intensive treatment (e.g., through additional examples or more elaborate explanations) could have led to an even greater shift in attitudes towards tailored algorithms. Given a lack of consensus about the motivation for blinding and an increased tendency to administer important societal goods through algorithmic decision making, it appears necessary to reevaluate the presumed imperative to blind algorithms. Of course, we note that a deviation from existing principles bears its own dangers. For instance, if the dogma of blind algorithms is successfully challenged, it could create potential for abusive and intentionally discriminatory practices. Such misuse

[18] Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009).

[19] Not every disparity in outcomes is a violation of Title VII. For instance, employer's can justify these disparities under the *business necessity* justification. The court suggested that the use of the test scores may have been justified in that way.

[20] Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971)

[21] "The injury arises in part from the high, and justified, expectations of the candidates who had participated in the testing process on the terms the City had established for the promotional process. Many of the candidates had studied for months, at considerable personal and financial expense, and thus the injury caused by the City's reliance on raw racial statistics at the end of the process was all the more severe." Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 593 (2009).

may be counteracted by, for example, prescribing blind decision making as a default rule and setting a high evidentiary standard for policy makers seeking to deviate from the default. Looking forward, we hope our results help researchers and policymakers chart an equitable path for designing and deploying algorithmic tools.

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